February, 1942

RECENT CASES
Administrative Law-Admissibility of Evidence Tending to Disqualify Member of N. L. R. B.-Employer petitioned to set aside
N. L. R. B. order and moved to adduce evidence which "bears the possibility of interpretation that" prior to the Board hearing a Board member
tried to instigate a boycott of the employer.' Motion granted, Board must
hear evidence and decide whether its member was disqualified, 2 Berkshire
Employees Ass'n, etc. v. N. L. R. B., 121 F. (2d) 235 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
The only clear holding of the case is that the Board must hear evidence tending to disqualify a member. The court said that the alleged
conduct amounted to acting as counsel for the union in an attempt to force
a settlement 8 and suggested, probably correctly, that such conduct would
have disqualified a judge.4 However, it carefully did not hold that the
conduct, if proved, would disqualify a Board member, but specifically left
that issue to the Board. The inference is that the Board is held to less
rigorous standards of impartiality than a court. The opinion requires
"fair play", "the resolution of contested questions by an impartial and
disinterested tribunal"." It is questionable whether that test will lead to
results different from those under the rule that a judge is disqualified for
interest or personal bias, especially since the latter springs from a concept
of fairness and the axiom that one may not judge his own case. However,
assuming a difference, can it be supported? The court reasoned that
because the Board must be "investigator, complainant, prosecutor, trier of
facts, declarer of law and administrator [it] must necessarily proceed in
a different fashion from . . . the courts." 6 But authorities, answering

charges of bias in trial examiners, have pointed out that in fact the Board
has separated its judicial functions from all others and sits as a court, thus
correcting errors from bias below. 7 Clearly if the Board in fact acts as a
judicial body, it is not inconvenient to hold it to similar standards of disinterestedness. On the other hand, the Board is not forced to remain
judicially aloof, and the Act provides that a member who participates in
an inquiry is not thereby disqualified from sitting on the case.8 This
suggests that any deviation from judicial standards should be to facilitate
the Board's numerous duties. Since the Board has no duty to represent
the union in pre-hearing conflicts, it should not be privileged to do so.
i. The evidence was not obtainable at the time of the Board hearing. It was
subsequently produced by a Congressional committee investigating the Board, Hearings before Special Committee to Investigate N. L. R. B. on H. R. 258, 76th Cong.
3rd Sess. (I94O).

2. The member challenged was Edwin S. Smith. His term expired, and he was
not reappointed. The Board then moved to resettle the instant order. Motion was
granted and a new order entered directing the Board to reconsider the case on its
merits without determining the question of Smith's disqualification, io U. S. L. W=x
2254 (Oct. 194).
3. Instant case at 239.
4. The leading case on disqualification of federal judges is Berger v. United
States, 255 U. S. 22 (1921). For general discussion see Notes (1927) 41 HAW. L.
REv. 78; (1g16) 29 H~av. L. REV. 430.
5. Instant case at 238.
6. Ibid.
7. Gellhorn and Linfield, Politics ad Labor Relations, (1939) 39 Coi. L. REV.
339, 359, 386, 388; Davey, Separationof Functions and The National Labor Relations
Board, (94o) 7 U. OF CHL L. REv. 328, 331.
8. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § i55 (Supp. I94).
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The Board can scarcely argue that its broad duty to promote industrial
peace implies a privilege to encourage settlements in this way, since it has
officially reprimanded its Regional Directors for similar actions justified by
similar reasoningY

Bankruptcy-Confirmation of Private Bid After Public SalePetitioner was the highest bidder for a mine at a well-attended, fairly
advertised and conducted public sale of bankruptcy assets. The referee
confirmed a subsequent private bid, only slightly higher, on the basis of
the public interest involved. Recognizing the action as a departure from
the usual rule the court held that the sale to the private bidder, who insured ". . . the reopening and operation of the mine and the consequent
employment of the former employees . . .", was proper. In re Prairie
Coal Co., 4o F. Supp. 894 (D. C. Ill. 1941).
The withholding of approval from the highest bidder at a properly
conducted public sale is frowned upon by the courts.- While the court
may or may not confirm at its discretion and is not limited to confirming
some bid already made, 2 yet where a judicial sale has been ordered and
reported, the powers of the referee are generally limited to confirming the
sale or rejecting it and ordering a new one.3 The public sale is, in most
instances, the best means yet devised for disposing of the estate of a bankrupt and protecting the interests of his creditors. The highest bidder must
have some assurance that his bid will be confirmed or the public sale will
become an empty gesture. This need has been recognized by the courts,
which have consistently held that mere inadequacy of price is not sufficient
reason for refusing confirmation. 4 The court, in approving the referee's
refusal to confirm, has driven an opening wedge for exceptions to the
general rule, and while the circumstances in the instant case may justify
the result, it is felt that the court should have stated in detail the exact facts
and limited the decision to those facts.5 Exceptions based on the tenuous
grounds of "public interest" open the door to local favoritism, private
prejudice, collusion, and other abuses which are extremely difficult to establish. The "'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions" 6 is always
present and should be carefully guarded against when the rule in question
is desirable.
9. Memorandum to Regional Directors, from Benedict Wolf, secretary to the
239, n. 2.

Board, set forth in instant case at

I. It re Wolke Lead Batteries Co., 294 Fed. 509 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923), see It re
Irvine, 225 Fed. 168, 169 (D. S. S. C. 1gg). The rule is so well established that the
problem seldom comes before the courts. For a general discussion, see 6 REMINGTON,
BANKRUPTCY

See

(4th ed., 1937) M§2531 to 2560.

2. it re Kline's Rapid Shoe Repair
BANKRUPTCY ACT § 70, II U. S. C.

Co., 54 F. (2d) 495 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1931).
A. § IiO (Supp. I94I), and General Order

REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY (5th ed., 194o) 1316.
3. Scott v. Jones, 118 F. (2d) 30 (C. C. A. ioth, 1941).
4. Ballentyne v. Smith, 205 U. S. 285 (1907), It re American Beaver Co., 245

No. 18, 9

Fed. 538 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1917). Cf. Coulter v. Blieden, lO4 F. (2d) 29 (C. C. A. 8th,
1939).
5. There is no statement that the petitioner refused to insure the reopening of the
mine. Further, there is no indication of the number of employees involved, nor of the
relative importance of the mine to the locality. When the possibilities of the decision
are considered, it becomes apparent that the statement of the facts and the opinion are
too brief.
6. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 299 N. Y. 458, 464, 164 N. E. 545, 546 (1928).
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Conflict of Laws-State Court's Power to Enjoin Suit in Foreign
Court Based on Federal Employers' Liability Act.-Petitioning railroad seeks an injunction in an Ohio state court restraining respondent, a
resident of Ohio, from continuing prosecution of an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act 1 in the federal court for the Eastern District
of New York. Respondent's suit is based on an injury which took place
in Ohio, and petitioner alleges that it is an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce and an unreasonable burden on petitioner because of
the expense and inconvenience involved in defending it in New York. On
demurrer for failure to state a cause of action, held (three justices dissenting),2 demurrer sustained. The Employers' Liability Act grants respondent the privilege of venue in any state or district court where petitioner is doing business, and a state court may not interfere with this
privilege by injunction. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Kepner, 62 Sup. Ct. 6
(194I) .
The power of a court of equity to enjoin vexatious and harassing
litigation by a domestic plaintiff in a foreign jurisdiction is well established.' Here petitioner claims that it will be caused substantial injustice
if the New York action is continued because of the expense of transporting
and maintaining witnesses there, while respondent will derive no corresponding benefit.5 The majority of the Court, while conceding the existence of the general equity power invoked by petitioner," relied strongly
on the history of the Employers' Liability Act 7 in holding that the state
court could not interfere with the privilege of venue given by it." This
view seems inconsistent with Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R.,9
I. s6 STAT. 1167 (I911), 45 U. S. C. A. § 56 (1928).
Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote the dissenting opinion in which the Chief Justice
and Mr. Justice Roberts concurred.
3. The demurrer was sustained in the trial court. This judgment was affirmed
2.

in the Supreme Court of Ohio, 137 Ohio 2o6 and 409, 28 N. E. (2d) 586, 30 N. E.
(2d) 982 (i94i) and by the Supreme Court per curiam, with the court equally divided,

in 313 U. S. 542 (1941). The principal case came up on petition for a rehearing.
4. A multiplicity of suits has been held to be enjoinable, French v. Hay, 22
Wall. 250 (U. S. 1874); as has avoidance of local rules of procedure, Weaver v.
Alabama G. S. R. R., 2o0 Ala. 432, 76 So. 364 (1917); avoidance of local exemption
laws, Snook v. Snetzer, 25 Ohio St. 516 (1886); avoidance of local insolvency laws, Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107 (1889).
See Note (igig) 33
HAv. L. REv. 92; Pound, The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919 (1920) 33 HAv.
L.Rv.420, 425.

5. Petitioner alleges that defense of the action in New York will cost $4,000

more than it would cost in Ohio. In New York, C. & St L. Ry. v. Mantzinger,
136 Ohio 271, 25 N. E. (2d) 349 (I94O), it was held that such additional expense

with no compensating advantage to the plaintiff made a suit in a foreign court enjoinable.
6. "Under such circumstances petitioner asserts power, abstractly speaking, in the
Ohio court to prevent a resident under its jurisdiction from doing inequity. Such
power does exist." Ifistant case at 9. "
7. Instant case at 8.
8. Almost all the decisions prior to the principal case have either granted an injunction in situations similar to this one, Ex Parte Crandall, 53 F. (2d) 969 (C. C. A.
7th, i93i); Kern v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry., 204 Ind. 595, 185 N. E. 446
0933); Illinois Central R. R. v. Miles, 174 Tenn. 676, 130 S. W. (21) II (1939),
or have asserted a power to grant an injunction if the expense to the petitioner became
too inequitable, Missour-K.-T. R. R. v. Ball, 126 Kan. 745, 271 Pac. 313 (1928);

Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Harden, 18 La. 889, io5 So. 2 (1925) ; Boston & M. R. R. v.
Whitehead, 3o7 Mass. io6, 29 N. k. (2d) 916 (1940) ; Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Inlow,
64 Ohio App. 134, 28 N. E. (2d) 373 (1940) ; Southern Pacific Co. v. Baum, 39 N. M.
22, 38 P. (2d) xio6 (1934).
Contra: McConnell v. Thomson, 213 Ind. i6, 8. N. E.
(2d) 986 (1937).

9. 279 U. S. 377 (1929). In this case a New York court refused to accept jurisdiction of an action between a Connecticut plaintiff and a Connecticut defendant
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where the Court held that a state court could refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under the same statute on the ground of forum non conveniens,
thereby in effect denying the privilege of venue which the Court here
upholds.' 0

However, the principal case reaches a sound result, since the

benefits which arise from injunction by a court of one jurisdiction of proceedings in another where the enjoining court is not protecting its own
decree are probably outweighed by the difficulties which are bound to
result from interference by one court in the business of another. Furthermore, petitioner can get much the same relief, which he seeks here by the
extraordinary remedy of injunction, by pleading the burden on interstate
commerce 11 and forum non conveniens 12 in the New York action.

Constitutional' Law-Constitutionality of an Act Prohibiting
School Bands From Competing with Professionals-Action to enjoin
enforcement of an act prohibiting bands and orchestras supported by pub-

lic funds from competing with civilian musicians. Held, injunction
granted, Act is class legislation and unconstitutional. Gentry v. Memphis
Federation of Musicians, Local No. 71, 177 Tenn. 566, 151 S. W.
1081 (1941).

(2d)

The purpose of the Act is stated in the title: "An Act to prohibit
bands and orchestras of public institutions, supported in whole or in part
from moneys raised from State, county, or municipal taxes, from competing with the employment of civilian musicians." 1 As the Act was primarily aimed at high school bands and orchestras, it is necessary to consider the effect only upon them. The Tennessee Supreme Court held
that this Act attempted ". . . to regulate the activities of citizens, who
happen to be students, in their relations with other citizens", 2 and therefore was class legislation and unconstitutional. 3 This conclusion is not a
natural inference from the Act. The Act does not mention or manifest
any intention to prohibit students from performing in open competition
with professional orchestras; it prohibits the bands and orchestras supported by public funds from competing.4 The court made no distinction
between student groups who do not depend on state aid for the maintenance of their band, and the authentic high school orchestra. However,
conceding for the purpose of argument that the Act did infringe upon
based on an accident which took place in Connecticut. The refusal was based on a
New York statute.
IO.Instant case, dissenting opinion, at 14.
ii. The Court held in the principal case that the New York action was not a
burden on interstate commerce under the rule of Hoffman v. Missouri ex rel Foraker,
274 U. S. 21 (1927) and Denver & R. G. W. Ry. v. Terte, 284 V. S. 284 (1931).
12. See Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-Anwricaiv Law
(1929) 29 COL. L. REv. I, 23-24. Although the grounds on which a court will refuse
to hear suit on the grounds of forum non convenzets are not necessarily the same as
those on which an injunction against suit in a foreign jurisdiction is based, both doctrines are founded on the misuse of judicial process by the plaintiff.
i. TENN., PUBLIC Acrs, 1939, c. 124.

2. See instant case at 569, 151 S. W. (2d) at lO82.
3. TENN. CoNsr., Art. x, § 8, Art. ii, § S. (These articles have been construed by
the court as being similar to the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution. Marion County River Transportation Co. v. Stokes,
173 Tenn. 347, 117 S. W. (2d) 740 (1938).)
4. See note I supra.
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the rights of students, and is "class legislation"; is it a necessary result that
the Act is unconstitutional? "Class legislation is unconstitutional only
when shown to be unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. If reasonable,
and for a beneficial public purpose, it is constitutional." 5 Is it then unreasonable for the people, through their elected representatives, to control
the manner in which the money they have contributed is to be used? The
court did not chose to discuss this problem in the instant case, but from
its silence the inference is that it thought so. It may be argued that it
is for a beneficial public purpose to increase the opportunity of employment for those of the community who earn their livelihood by their skill
-as musicians, and the question of whether the public is better served by
open competition of this group with one that has no need of the employment, and which derives its total support from the taxpayers, is of sufficient importance to merit recognition by the court. The court here may
have felt that the legislature was coddling the labor unions by such legis-,
lation, and allowed this to influence its reasoning. "Whether the enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory,
whether it is the best means to achieve the desired result, whether, in
short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner, are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the earnest conflict of serious opinion does not suffice to bring
them within the range of judicial cognizance." 8
Corporations-Validity of Pledge of Bonds for Pre-existing Debt
Under Constitutional Provision Requiring That Money Be Actually
Received-In proceedings for corporate reorganization of debtor,
creditor bank filed petition as a secured creditor to determine value of
collateral which consisted of bonds pledged several years after the incurring
of the debt. geld, bank is unsecured creditor; bonds were invalidly
pledged for a pre-existing debt in violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution which requires that bonds be issued only for "money, labor done, or
money or property actually received." I In re Mifflinburg Body Co., 41 F.
Supp. 9 (M. D. Pa. 1941).'
The provision that bonds shall be issued only for money, labor done,
or money or property actually received is included in the constitutions of
5. See Lundstrom v. Ellsworth Township, 196 Mich. 5o2, 50S, 162 N. W. 99o, 992
(1917); State ex rel. Astor v. Schlitz Brewing Co. et al., io4 Tenn. 715, 59 S. W.

1033 (i9oo) ; Sutton v. State, 96 Tenn. 696, 36 S. W. 697 (i86) ; Stratton et al. v.
Dibrell et al., 89 Tenn. 497, 15 S. W. 87 (89I).
6. See Chicago, B. & Quincy R. R. Co. v. McQuire, 219 U. S. 549, 569 (igio).

x. PA. CoxsT. Art. XVI, § 7.
2. Accord, In re Paul Delaney Co., Inc., 23 F. (2d) 737 (W. D. N. Y. 1927);
Lyon v. Bleeg, 240 Fed. 405 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917) ; In re Progressive Wallpaper
Corp., 229 Fed. 489 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916); Kemmerer v. St. Louis Blast Furnace Co.,
212 Fed. 63 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. San Diego Street
Car Co., 45 Fed. 518 (C. C. S. D. Cal. 189i). Contra: Cloverdale Cotton Mills et al.
v. Alabama National Bank, 219 Ala. 50, 51, 121 So. 54, 55 (1929); see Win. Firth
Co. et al. v. South Carolina Loan & Trust Co., 122 Fed. 569, 575 (1903) ; Nelson v.
Hubbard, 96 Ala. 238, 250, 251, i So. 428, 432, 433 (1892).
The bank was indenture trustee for bondholders under a mortgage, but its petition in these same proceedings as trustee was dismissed because it failed to comply
with the provisions of sections 212 and 213 of chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, ii
U. S. C. A. §§ 612, 613 (1939). This was done without prejudice, for the bank was
given leave to file another petition which would comply with the requirements.
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many states.3 With regard to bonds pledged as collateral, 4 and in absence
of state court construction, the federal courts have consistently interpreted the provision to render invalid bonds pledged to secure a preexisting debt. 6 This construction cannot be deduced from a strict reading
of the provision,7 for a pre-existing debt representing money lent is "money
actually received". To formulate the announced rule, the federal courts
interpret the provision to require that the pledging of the bonds must induce the lending of the money." But the policy behind the provision is to
prevent any "fictitious" increase in the corporation's indebtedness.9 Pledging bonds to secure payment of a debt-whether presently or previously
incurred-is not, logically, increasing a corporation's indebtedness. If
anything, it is a method of converting a short-term obligation, in the event
of default by the corporation, into a long-term obligation, which is not
unfavorable to a corporation which cannot meet its present obligations.
And where the pledging of the bonds induces an extension of time, as
here, the corporation is getting legal consideration, even though the courts
say consideration is immaterial. 10 For purposes of bankruptcy or cor3. ALA. CONST. § 234; ARiZ. CoNsr. Art. XIV, § 6; Agx. CoNsT. Art. XII, § 8;
COLO. CONST. Art. XV, § 9; IDAHO CONsT. Art. XI, § 9; ILL. CONST. Art. XI, § I3;
Ky. CONsT. § 193; Mo. CONsT. Art. XII, § 8; MONT. CoNsT. Art. XV, § IO; NEB.
CONST. Art. XII, § 6; N. D. CoiwsT. Art. VII, § 138; S. C. CONST. Art. IX, § io;
S. D. CoNsT. Art XVII, § 8; TEx. CoxsT. Art. XII, § 6; UTAH CoxsT. Art. XII,
§ 5; WASH. CONST. Art. XII, § 6. Similar provisions in the Delaware and Olda-

honia Constitutions refer only to stock, and not bonds. The provision in the California Constitution referring both to stocks and bonds was repealed November 4,
1930, CAL. CoNST. Art. XII, § ii.
New Jersey, New York, and Wisconsin have
similar statutes.
4. These provisions do not prohibit the issuance of corporate bonds by way of
pledge: In re Sharon-Warren Iron & Metal Co., 7 F. (2d) 475, 476 (W. D. Pa.
1925); Atlantic Trust Co. v. Woodbridge Canal & Iriigation Co., 79 Fed. 842 (N. D.
Cal. 1897). That pledging of bonds is a valid issue: Memphis & Little Rock Railroad Co. v. Dow, 120 U. S. 287 (1887); Kuehne v. Highland Glades Drainage Dist.,
54 F. (2d) 946 (S. D. Fla. 193i). That bonds are valid even though pledged below
par: Mercer v. Steil, 97 Conn. 583, 117 Atl. 126 (i9o6); United States Cast Iron
Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Henry Vogt Machine Co., 182 Ky. 473, 2o6 S. W. 8o6 (i918);
Miller v. Hellam Distilling Co., 57 Pa. Super. 183 (914).
5. Instant Case at ii mentions the rule that state court construction is controlling,
but that such is scarce. Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias v. Meyer, i98 U. S.
5o8, 520 (igo5), "The construction placed upon a local statute by the highest judicial tribunal of the state enacting it will as a rule be followed by the federal courts
without criticism or further inquiry."
6. See cases cited. supra note 2.
7. The Pennsylvania provision reads: "No corporation shall issue stocks or bonds
except for money, labor done, or money or property actually received; and all fictitious increase of stock or indebtedness shall be void." PA. CokTsr. Art. XVI, § 7.
8. Instant Case at 12. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. San Diego Street Car Co.,
45 Fed. 518 (C. C. S. D. Cal. i89I).
9. In Memphis & Little Rock Railroad v. Dow, 120 U. S. 287 (1887), at 298
it is said that the prohibition was intended to protect stockholders against spoilation
and to guard against securities that were absolutely worthless.
io. Instant case at i2; Lyon v. Bleeg, 24o Fed. 405 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917), cert.
denied, 244 U. S. 66o (1917) ; In re Progressive Wallpaper Corp., 229 Fed. 489 (C. C.
A. 2d, I916) ; Mudge v. Black, 224 Fed. 919 (C. C. A. 8th, 195), cert. denied, 239
U. S. 64a (1915). There was no objection at common law to a pledge of corporate
bonds as security for an antecedent debt in consideration of a renewal or extension of a
loan. Lehman Brothers v. Tallassee Manufacturing Co., 64 Ala. 567 (I879); Curtis
v. Leavitt, I5 N. Y. 9 (1857). "This conclusion [that extension of time is not enough]
has been the subject of strong adverse criticism and the courts have strained to avoid
its consequences whenever distinguishing circumstances have been presented." Hatch,
A Form of Depression Finance-CorporationsPledging Their Own Bonds (1934) 47
HAuv. L. Rrv. 1093, 1101. See In re Progressive Wallpaper Corp., 229 Fed. 5oo (C.
C. A. 2d, i916) (dissenting opinion) ; Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co. v.
Brooklyn Rapid Transit Co., 288 Fed. 221, 230-33 (D. C. N. Y. 1923).
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porate reorganization, a rule such as the one here enunciated results in
the court's protecting one group of creditors over another. By declaring
the bonds to be invalidly issued, the ranks of the secured creditors (secured
in that the obligation pledged is secured by specific corporation property)
are kept from being invaded by an unsecured creditor who has subsequently
become secured. That the constitutional provision was designed to give
such protection is nowhere evident from its terms. And in the absence
of fraud or collusion-in which event the creditors have an action l_there is little perceptible reason why the courts should frown upon one
who has given value and has been diligent enough to get security.
Federal Jurisdiction-Right of Foreign Corporation to Sue in
Federal Courts When Barred From State Courts Because of NonCompliance with State Statute-An Indiana statute 1 provides that a
foreign corporation can maintain no cause of action in the state courts if2
such corporation has failed to comply with Indiana's statutory regulations
regarding foreign corporations doing business within the state. The foreign assignee of a non-complying, defunct, foreign corporation brought
action in the federal court in Indiana. Held: The federal courts can
enforce the foreign assignee's claim notwithstanding the Indiana statute,,
and the ruling of the Indiana courts.4 Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Barnett, Ix8 F. (2d) 19o (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) citing as controlling
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Kane, II7 F. (2d) 398 (C. C. A. 7th,
1941).
Statutes such as the Indiana statute 5 in question are not uncommon,
and the federal courts have consistently avoided them by granting the nonA pledge of bonds in substitution for other collateral securing an antecedent debt
has been held valid. In re De Laney Co., Inc., 26 F. (2d) 96I (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
Where pledgej!to secure in part new advances as well as for an antecedent debt, the
legality has been upheld. In re Sharon-Warren Iron & Metal Co., 7 F. (2d) 475
(W. D. Pa. 1925) :li re Waterloo Organ Co., 1.14 Fed. 345 (C. C. A. 2d, 1904), cert.
denied, i97 U. S. 62 (io5); cf. Central Trust Co. v. Missouri K. & T. Railway Co.,
247 Fed. 586 (E. D. Mo. 1917).
Where agreement for original loan contemplates a subsequent pledge of corporate
bonds as collateral, such a pledge has been held a valid issue of the bonds. Woods
Sons Co. v. Southern Trust Co.. 13 F. (2d) 367 (C. C. A. 3rd. i926) ; Rahway National Bank v. Thompson, 7 F. (2d) 419 (C. C. A. .rd, 1925) : Westinghouse Electric
& Manufacturing Co. v. Brooklyn Rapid Transit Co., 288 Fed., 221 (S. D. N. Y.
1923).

In Pennsylvania, giving of a mortgage to secure a debt is valid and is not an increase of the indebtedness of the debtor, Manhattan Hardware Co. v. Phalen, 128 Pa.
nio, i8 Atl. 428 (1889) ; and giving a mortgage as collateral security-for a pre-existing
debt has been considered valid, AhI v. Rhoads, 84 Pa. 3ig (1877).
ir. "General rules of law for the protection of creditors may, of course, affect the
validity of the pledge. Thus, if made for an antecedent debt, a voidable lien may be
created under Section 67d of the Bankruptcy Act. Or should the pledge amount to a
fraud on other creditors of the pledgor, it is open to attack by a creditor's bill in receivership proceedings or in bankruptcy." Hatch, A Form of Depression FinanceCorporationsPledging Their Osw Bonds (1934) 47 HARv. L. REV. Io93, iO2.
IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin 1934) § 4972.
2. IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin 1934) N§ 4959-4972.
3. IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin 1934) § 4972.
4. Barnett v. Central Republic Bank, xoo Ind. App. 495, 196 N. E. 369 (1935)
(action on same claim as in instant Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Barnett,
118 F. (2d) I9O (C. C. A. 7th, 1941)) ; Burroughs v. Southern Colonization Co.. 96
Ind. Apt). 93, 173 N. E. 716 (190.o); Lowenmeyer v. National Lumber Co., 71 Ind.
App. 458, 125 N. E. 67 (191); Swing v. Toner, 178 Ind. 1O2, 96 N. E. 946 (1912).
5. IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin 1934) § 4972.
r.
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complying, foreign corporation access to the federal courts.0 It is generally held that a state is powerless to impair the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, 7 which is conferred by the Constitution and Congress." Although
jurisdiction over these disputes involving a diversity of citizenship is always
assumed by the federal courts, 9 if the relevant statute is found to declare as
a matter of substantive law that claims of non-complying corporations are
void even though the foreign corporation may have complied subsequent to
its acquisition of a claim, the statute is binding on the federal courts, and no
relief can be granted. 10 In the instant cases it was correctly observed that the
Indiana courts had expressly held claims of non-complying corporations to
Thus the statute enunciated
be unenforceable only before compliance."
procedural rather than substantive law that the federal courts must recognize. Although, in general, the federal courts' taking jurisdiction would
appear unfortunate in that the power of a state to control certain aspects
of business within its boundaries is nullified, the instant decisions remedy
a situation otherwise incurable under the statute and rulings of the Indiana
courts. 12 The Indiana courts hold that a non-complying, foreign corporation can enforce its claims in the state courts by complying with the statutory requirements before suing.13 Thus it is not their policy altogether to
deny relief to the offending corporation. However, in the instant cases,
the plaintiffs were assignees of defunct, non-complying corporations, and
the assignee-plaintiffs are without a remedy in the state courts even though
they, themselves may be licensed under the statute. Effective compliance is
impossible, because, since the assignor has no legal existence, it cannot comply, and the assignee can be in no better position than his assignor.' 4 Thus
the instant decisions in allowing the plaintiffs relief not only rest upon
unimpeachable authority but in the light of the peculiar circumstances are
not unconformable with the spirit of the Indiana law.
6. David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club, 225 U. S. 489 (1912); Republic
Creosoting Co. v. Boldt Const. Co., 38 F. (2d) 739 (C. C. A. 6th, 193o); Kawin &
Co. v. American Colortype Co., 243 F. 317 (C. C. A. 7th, 917); Boatmen's Bank v.
Fritzlen, 221 Fed. 154 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915); Richmond Cedar Works v. Buckner, 181
Fed. 424 (C. C. S. D. N. Y., igio); Johnson v. New York Breweries Co., 178 Fed.
513 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910) ; 2 HUGEEs, FaDERAL PRACricE JURisDiCnION AND PRocEmUPE
(931) § 712.
7. Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, i70 U. S. loo (I898); Stephenson v. Grand
Trunk Western R. R., no F. (2d) 4oi (C. C. A. 7th, 1940); Johnson v. New York
Breweries Co., 178 Fed. 513 (C. C. A. 2d, igo); Grotton Bridge & Mfg. Co. v.
American Bridge Co., 151 Fed. 871 (C. C. N. D. N. Y., :907); Barling v. Bank of

British N. A., 5o Fed. 260 (C. C. A. 9th, 1892) ; Bamberger Broadcasting Service v.
William I. Hamilton, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 273 (S. D. N. Y., 194o).
8. U. S. Const. Art III, §2 (1) ; 28 U. S C. A. § 41 (:).
9. 28 U. S. C. A. §41 (1).
io. Diamond Glue Co. v. United States Glue Co., 187 U. S. 611 (903)
1O3

affirming

Fed. 838 (C. C. E. D. Wis., igoo); Pittsburgh Const. Co. v. West Side Best R.

Co., I54 Fed. 929 (C. C. A. 3d, 1907); McCanna & F. Co. v. Citizens' Trust and
Surety Co., 76 Fed. 42o (C. C. A. 3d, 1896); Thomas v. Birmingham Ry., Light &
Power Co., 195 Fed. 340 (N. D. Ala., 1912).
ii. Selph v. Illinois Pipe Line Co., 206 Ind. 490, 190 N. E. 191 (934); State ex
rel. J. B. Speed & Co., v. Traylor, 989 Ind. App. 290, 173 N. E. 461 (930); Peter &
Burghard Stone Co. v. Carper, 96 Ind. App. 554, 172 N. E. 319 (930)

United States Construction Co. v. Hamilton National Bank, 73 Ind. App.
E. 866 (192o).

-

overriding
126 N.

149,

Barnett v. Central Republic Bank & Trust Co., Ioo Ind. App. 495, 196 N. E.
369 (1935) (action brought on same claim as in Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Barnett, 118 F. (2d) i9o (C. C. A. 7th, 1941)); Lowenmeyer v. National Lumber Co., 71 Ind. App. 458, 125 N. E. 67 (1919) ; Wiestling Rec. v. Warthin,
12.

i Ind. App. 217, 27 N. E. 576 (I89I).

x3. See note ii supra, which collects the cases.
14. See note 12 =prO.
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Federal Procedure-New York Rule of Automatic Subrogation
Held Binding on Bankruptcy Court-Trustee of mortgagor in reorganization proceedings under 77B seeks to subordinate the claims of the
insolvent guarantor of the mortgage participation certificates, who has
repurchased certain certificates and who owns the uncertificated part of the
mortgage, to the claims of the other certificate holders. Held (one judge
dissenting), both of the guarantor's claims must be subordinated. Although
the certificates contain no express provision for subordination of the guarantor, this court is bound by decisions of the New York Court of Appeals
holding that such a provision will be presumed. Geist v. Prudence Realization Corp., 122 F. (2d) 503 (194I).

The New York rule is based on the theory that it would be inequitable
to allow the guarantor of a mortgage debt to share in the proceeds of the
property where they are insufficient to satisfy the claims of the other certificate holders.' Where, as in the instant case, the guarantor is insolvent,
application of the rule has been criticized. 2 It is said that subordination
of the guarantor's claim injures his other creditors while the certificate
holders get a windfall through the adventitious fact that the guarantor has
repurchased certain certificates."
However, the New York Court of
Appeals has continued to subordinate the guarantor's claims in such cases
on the ground that the rule is one of implied intent which cannot vary with
the solvency or insolvency of the guarantor. 4 Arguing that in fact the New
York rule was not a rule of contract law but rather one of insolvency
administration, the dissenting judge maintained that the Bankruptcy Act
relieved this court from following it.i However, in the face of the rulings
to the contrary by the New York court,6 this position seems difficult to
support, and the dissent's contention resolves itself into the question of
whether rules of presumption are substantive or procedural.7 Although
i. In re Union Guarantee & Mortgage Co., 285 N. Y. 337, 34 N. E. (2d) 345
(ig4i) ; Pink v. Thomas, 282 N. Y. 10, 24 N. E. (2d) 724 (1939) ; Matter of Lawyers Title & Guaranty Co., 279 N. Y. 573, 17 N. E. (2d) 444 (1938); Matter of
Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co. of Sullivan County, 275 N. Y. 347, 9 N. E. (2d) 957
(1937). The same rule is followed in other jurisdictions. Louisville Title Co. v. Crab

Orchard Banking Co., 249 Ky. 736, 61 S. W. (2d) 615 (1933); Agricultural Trust &

Savings Co.'s Case, 329 Pa. 581, 198 Atl. 16 (1938), lower court decision noted sab
noin. It re Phillippi in (1938) 86 U. oF PA. L. Rxv. 785; Fourth National Bank's
Appeal, r23 Pa. 473, 16 Atl. 779 (x886) ; Fidelity Trust Co. v. Orr, 154 Tenn. 538,
289 S. W. 500 (1926). 5 TInANY, REAL PROPzrY (3d ed. 1939) § 1458.
2. If the reason for the rule is to avoid circuity of action, its application where
the guarantor is insolvent would not be justified. Kelly v. Middlesex Title Guarantee
& Trust Co., 115 N. J. Eq. 592, 171 Atl. 823, aff'd 116 N. J. Eq. 574, 174 Atl. 706
(1934).

3. Instant case, dissenting opinion, 507, 5o8 (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. iv. 785;
Note (1938) 47 YALE L. f. 480. But where the basis of the rule is the inequity of allowing the guarantor to deprive the certificate holders of the proceeds of a debt which
he has promised to see paid, the fact that he is insolvent should not change the equities
of the situation merely because his creditors, not parties to the foreclosure action, may
incidentally be injured.
4. "In this state, at least, avoidance of circuity of action has, however, never been
the basis of the rule. . . Determination of the relative rights of an assignor and assignee of part of a cause of action, depends, in each case, upon the intention of the
parties, express or implied, actual or presumed." Matter of Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co. of Sullivan County, 275 N. Y. 347, 354, 9 N. E. (2d) 957, 959 (I937). See
New York cases cited note i, supra, in all of which the guarantor was insolvent.
5. Instant case, dissenting opinion, at 5io. "The rule of the state court is squarely
contrary to the federal rule under the federal Bankruptcy statute. . .". Only the
Bankruptcy clause (U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8 (4)) is cited to support this proposition.
It is not indicated what the federal rule is or where it has been applied.
6. See note 4, mspra.
7. To the effect that rules of presumption and burden of proof should be considered procedural, see GoomcRH, Coimucr op LAws (2d ed. 1938) § 81; 3 MooRE,
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there are no decisions exactly on point, for the purpose of determining
whether state rules of presumption should be followed by federal courts
under the doctrine of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins,8 the trend of authority
seems to favor the view taken by the majority of the court.' Failure to
apply the New York rule of presumption in this case would inevitably lead
to a different result from that which would have been reached had the case
been tried in a state court. Under these circumstances, the spirit, if not
the letter, of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins impelled the court to follow the state
decisions. The uniformity desirable under the Bankruptcy Act is not such
uniformity as will contravene the state rules under which the parties dealt.10
Security Transactions-Reservation of Interest in Future Crops
by Vendor of Land-Plaintiff agreed to convey land to X, payment
to be made in annual installments out of the proceeds of the land, before
such proceeds were applied to any other obligation. Taldng possession of
the land, X gave defendant, who knew of the contract, a chattel mortgage
on crops planted and to be planted thereon. Money realized from the sale
of crops and from a government subsidy apportioned to the land, was
assigned by X to defendant. Plaintiff claims the money by virtue of the
contract with X. Held, plaintiff had no interest in the crops that would
support an action against chattel mortgagee. Snipes v. Dexter Gin Co.,
II6 P. (2d) IOI9 (N. M. I94i).
A possessor of land under a contract to convey is the beneficial and
equitable owner thereof.' As equitable owner of the land he is the owner
of crops growing or to be grown. 2 Any claim or interest plaintiff may
have in the crop in controversy, or the government subsidy, arises from the
peculiar terms of this contract to convey.8 The instant court construes it
as reserving no lien on crops growing or to be grown, deeming inapplicable
the landlord's lien statute. 4 Nor does the contract operate to create an
FEDERAL PRACTIcE (1938) 3071. But see r MooRE FEDERAL PRACTIcE (Supp. 1940)
114, 115; Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, (1933) 42

L. J. 333, 355, 356, where the author suggests that the fundamental purpose for
which the classification is made should be considered in.each case.
8. 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
P .In Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U. S. 2o (1939), (1940) 88 U. OF
PA.L. REV. 482, it was held that the Texas rule of burden of proof of bona fide purYALE

chase was a rule of substance and was to be followed in federal courts under Erie
R. R. v. Tompkins. . . In Sampson v. Channell (C. C. A. 1st 194o) n1o F. (2d) 754,
cert. den. 310 U. S. 65o (1940), 88 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. IOO it was held that the burden
of proof of contributory negligence was a rule of substance.
1O. See, for a different treatment of the instant problem, (1941)
55 HARV. L.
REV. 283.
:. Rives v. James, 3 S. W. (2d) 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Sewell v. Underhill,
197 N. Y. 168, go N. E. 43o (igo). A long list of authorities supporting this view
is given in a note to the Sewell case in 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 233.
2. Look v. Norton, 94 Me. 547, 48 AtI. 117 (igoi) ; Moen v. Lillestal, 5 N. D.
327, 65 N. W. 694 (895).
Since a landlord or mortgagee cannot maintain trover
for conversion of crops taken by a tenant or mortgagor in possession, if severed by him
while his possession is allowed to continue, these courts feel that the same principle
necessarily applies between the owner and one who is in possession by permission of
the owner under a contract to purchase.
3. Lynch v. Sprague Roiler Mills, 5i Wash. 535, 99 Pac. 578 (9og) ; Clarke v.
Cobb, 121 Cal. 595, 54 Pac. 74 (i8g8) ; Dixon v. Niccolls, 39 Ill, 372, 89 Am. Dec. 312
(1866) ; Williams v. Smith, 7 Ind. 599 (1856). The occupier of land is the owner
of all crops harvested during the term of his occupancy, whether he be purchaser
in possession, tenant in possession, or a mere trespasser in possession holding adversely. It follows then that any claims to crops issuing from the land, must be based
by the vendor, lessor or owner upon contractual provisions.
4. N. M. STAT. ANN. (1929) § 82-ioi. The court does not feel that the relation
is in effect one of landlord and tenant. Therefore it refuses to apply the statute.
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equitable assignment, being merely a promise to pay out of a particular
fund, without placing it beyond the control of the promisor.5 Having thus
disposed of the contract and the statute, the court concludes that the vendee,
as owner of crops grown on the demised premises, could legally mortgage
them. The rule that a bargain for the present transfer of future goods
does not operate as an extinction of the transferor's power to otherwise
dispose of them, even though so intended by the parties," is subject to several exceptions.7 Most important, perhaps, is the doctrine of Holroyd v.
Marshall,8 that a contract to give security in goods to be later acquired is
automatically operative to vest an equitable security interest in the lender
from the moment the goods are acquired. This interest may be cut off,
by a transfer of the goods to a purchaser for value without notice. 9 It
would seem that the instant case affords an analogous situation, yet the
court attaches no significance to the fact that chattel mortgagee had full
knowledge of the terms of the contract. Such knowledge might well have
been deemed prejudicial to the valid acceptance of a mortgage on the crops.
To hold that knowledge is not so operative, in effect sanctions profit by
conduct which the actor knows to be wrong. The court might have argued
that nothing was to prevent vendee from using the mortgage money to discharge his obligation to vendor, as indeed he may well have done. Or the
court might have been reluctant to impede the free marketability of the
crops. However, these considerations are left unmentioned. The crux of
the decision is the failure of the contract provisions to reserve to vendor
an interest in the future crops. One is prompted to inquire as to the
lengths to which one must go, in order to reserve such an interest as will
be accorded protection by this court.
Taxation-Dividends Paid Credit for Taxfree Liquidating Dividend in Computation of Undistributed Profits Tax-Taxpayer made a
distribution in liquidation and, in its undistributed profits tax 1 return,
claimed a dividends paid credit for the amount paid out of earnings. Distributee was parent corporation in whose hands the distribution was therefore not subject to the income tax.2 Held, credit allowed; subsection
5. Kuppenheimer v. Mornin, 78 F. (2d) 261 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935); Smedley v.
Speckman, I57 Fed. 8I 5 (C. C. A. 3d, io7); Kahnt v. Jones McKean Mercantile
Co., 32 N. M. 537, 26o Pac. 673 (1927). This is the rule even where the fund was

created through the efforts and outlays of the party asserting the lien. 3 PomERoY,
EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. I918) §§ 1280-1282; I JONES, LIENs (3d ed. 1914)

§§ 48-52. It is interesting to note that the strict requirements necessary to create an
equitable assignment have been broadened by the Supreme Court in the cases of contingent fees for attorneys. Barnes v. Alexander, 232 U. S. 117 (1914); Ingersoll v.
Coram,

211

U. S. 335 (i9o8).

6. The leading case is Low v. Pew, io8 Mass. 347, 11 Am. Rep. 357 (187i) (fish
to be caught). Other cases are: Davis-Watkins Dairymen's Mfg. Co. v. Cronin

Dairy & Ice Cream Co., i86 Wis. io6, 2o2 N. W. 293 (925) (milk bottles to be
manufactured); Gile v. Lasselle, 89 Ore. 107, 171 Pac. 741 (1918) (prunes to be

acquired).
7. One of these is the so-called doctrine of potential possession under which it is
said that even though a seller did not have the goods actually, yet he could make an
operative transfer if he had them potentially.
8. io H. L. Cas. I9I (i86i).

9. Some controversy may of course arise as to how wide is the range to be in-

cluded within this term. A distinction sometimes encountered growing out of certain

statutory provisions is that judgment creditors and the trustee in bankruptcy are entitled to priority over unrecorded equitable mortgages, as if they were purchasers for
value without notice. See, for instance, Bell v. N. Y. Safety Steam Power Co., 183
Fed. 274 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. igio).
x. Revenue Act of 1936 § i4. Cf. Revenue Act of 1938 § 13 (c) (2) (B).
2. IxrT REV. CoDE § 112 (b) (6) (1940). The shareholder corporation must own

8o per cent. of the capital stock and the distribution must be in complete liquidation
of the subsidiary; ibid.
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27 (h) of the 1936 Revenue Act, providing that no credit shall be allowed
for any part of a distribution which is not a taxable dividend in the shareholder's hands, can have no application because, under subsection 27 (f) ,4
the amount distributed in liquidation out of earnings must "for the purposes of computing the . . . credit . . . , be treated as a taxable dividend paid." Helvering v. 'CreditAlliance Corporation, 122 F. (2d) 361

(C. C. A. 4 th, 1941).

5

Same holding: Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Kay Mfg. Corporation, 122 F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941)."
The undistributed profits tax is primarily intended to prevent the
avoidance of surtax by individuals through accumulation of income by corporations. 7 Therefore its main purpose is to force corporate income into
the hands of the individual shareholders where the graduated surtax rate
can be given its full differential effect." When the corporate distribution
is not taxable in the hands of an otherwise taxable 9 shareholder (because
there is no realization, or no gain is recognized, etc.) this purpose cannot
be achieved and there is no need for compelling such distributions for
which, consequently, no credit should be allowed; such is apparently the
intended effect of 27 (h). 1- Distributions in liquidation, as distinguished
from operating dividends, are treated as sales of stock, and may or may not
be taxed depending upon the basis of each share.1 ' If the basis is high
3. "NoNTAxABLE DISTRBUTIoNs-If any part of a distribution (including stock
dividends and stock rights) is not a taxable dividend in the hands of such of the
shareholders as are subject to taxation under this title for the period in which the
distribution is made, no dividends paid credit shall be allowed with respect to such
part." Revenue Act of 1936 §27 (h). A substantially similar provision occurs
in Revenue Act of 1938 §27 (i); INT. Rxv. CODE § 27 (i) (940).
4. "DismRmuixO s IN LIQulWTrioN-In the case of amounts distributed in liquidation the part of such distribution which is properly chargeable to the earnings or
profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, shall, for the purposes of computing the
dividends paid credit under this section, be treated as a taxable dividend paid." Revenue Act of 1936 § 27 (f). A substantially similar provision occurs in Revenue Act
of 1938 §27 (g); INT. REv. CODE §27 (g) (1940).
5. Affg Credit Alliance Corporation, 42 B. T. A. lO2O (1940) (2 members dissented, citing Centennial Oil Co. v. Thomas, log F. (2d) 359 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940)).
Petition for certiorari was filed October 21, 1941; Supreme Court Docket No. 708,
October Term, 1941.
6. Aff'g Kay Mfg. Corporation, memo. op. 42 B. T. A. 1480 (1940). Certiorari
applied for; Supreme Court Docket No. 709, October Term, 1941.
7. SEIDMAN, LFoisLATivE HIsTORY OF FEDERAL INcOME TAx LAWS (938)
208.
H. R. REP. No. 2475, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 3; President's message to Congress, id. at I.
8. The tax is essentially in the nature of a threat. It is, w.henever applied, a
poor substitute for the individual surtax because it is as blind to individual situations as the normal corporate flat rate. It serves its purpose better when it induces
the corporation to distribute its income; see note 7 supra.
9. Where the distribution is not taxed merely because the shareholder is not
otherwise subject to taxation there is no need for making an exception. See Revenue Act of 1936 §27 (h) and INT. Rxv. CODE §27 (i) (i94o), both cited note 3

supra.

io. Ibid. Subsection 27 (h) is somewhat ambiguous. Its title is "Nontaxable distributions" but it reads "If . . . a distribution . . . is not a taxable dividend. . ..
(Ital. added) thus lending great strength to the argument that, if 27 (f) is to be
given any effect, 27 (h) can have no application to distributions in liquidation since
the latter can never be taxable dividends stricto sesu. See Commissioner v. Kay
Mfg. Corp., 122 F. (2d) 443, 445 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941). A partial liquidation, however, may be treated as a taxable dividend where it is "substantially equivalent" to
a taxable dividend under INT. REv. CODE § 115 (g) (1940).
Ii. INT. RIv. CODE § 115 (c) (194o); Hellmich v. Hellman, 276 U. S. 233
(1928); see Magill, The Income Tax Liability of Dividends in Liquidation (1925)
23 MicH. L. REV. 565; Note (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1146.
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and there is no gain and hence no tax, this is generally because the increase
in value resulting from the accumulation of earnings had been realized by,
and taxed to, the shareholder's transferor at the time of the transfer. Since
it is taxed at some time, the distribution should, for the purpose of computing the credit, be treated as a taxable dividend paid. While 27 (f)
accomplishes this result, it is so sweeping in terms 12 that it apparently
embraces not only those liquidating distributions which are taxed whenever
there is a gain, but also liquidating distributions which are necessarily taxfree because the gain, if any, is not recognized.18 In order to encourage
the simplification of corporate structures, 4 no gain or loss is recognized
where the distributee is, as here, a parent corporation 5 Thus both 27 (f)
and 27 (h) might conceivably apply to the facts of the instant cases; and
in the absence of any specific expression of Congressional intent'" it cannot be ascertained whether they were meant to be mutually exclusive, as
the language of 27 (f) would indicate. The first decided case, Centennial
Oil Co. v. Thomas,' upholding the policy of the undistributed profits tax,'
disallowed the credit on the ground that 27 (h) created an exception to
27 (f) ; the latter thus being apparently limited, in spite of the language of
both subsections, to exclude cases where no gain is recognized.' 9 The two
instant decisions, however, went on the ground that the very language of
20
27 (f) precluded any application of 27 (h)
and affirmed the Board's holding 21 that 27 (f) covers distributions in liquidation and 27 (h) dividends,
the distinction between taxable and taxfree applying exclusively to the
latter. These courts felt that the 'dominant policy was the simplification of
12. ". . . shall, for the purposes of computing the dividends paid credit under
this section, be treated as a taxable dividend paid." (Ital. added.) This seems to

exclude 27 (h) which is in the same section and applies to nontaxable distributions.
13. See the restrictive construction of U. S. Treas. Reg. g4, Art. 27 (f) which,
however, authorizes the parent to transfer its dividends paid credit to the subsidiary
under certain defined conditions.
14. SEIDMAi, LzGlsLATIvE HisTORy OF FEanAL IxcoX TAx LAWS (1938)
242; President's message to Congress, H. R. RE,. No. 1681, 74th Cong., Ist Sess.

(1935) 4.

i5. INT. Rzv. CODE § 112 (b) (6) (194o), cited note 2 supra.
16. Congress clearly expressed the two conflicting policies, see notes 7 and 14
supra; but gave no hint as to the way 27 (f) and 27 (h) should be construed where
both might conceivably apply.
37. iog F. (2d) 359 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) (I judge dissenting), cert. denied, 309
U. S. 69o (1940), cited note 5 supra. This case was decided on appeal not from an
order of the B. T. A. but from a judgment of a district court.
8. The decision assumed, without squarely facing the conflict of policies, that
the dominant one was that of the undistributed profits tax.
ig. It must be noted that 27 (h), if taken as a literal exception to 27 () would
limit the latter to distributions in liquidation which are "taxable dividends" in shareholders' hands; 27 (f) would thus become an empty shell; see note io supra. Since
this is clearly not the result stated by the court (see text) the opinion must have
construed "dividends" to include all corporate distributions and "taxable" to exclude
only "tax free because no gain is recognized"; thus adding a strained construction
of 27 (h) to its disregard of the compelling language of 27 (f) ; see note 12 supra.
The court actually seized upon 27 (h) as a pretext for redrafting 27 (f) as it should
have read.
20. The Treasury also contended that the distribution was not "properly chargeable to earnings and profits" and relied on Revenue Act of 1936 § 115 (h) providing that a nontaxable intercorporate distribution of stock shall not be considered a
distribution of earnings. Both courts held that the phrase merely meant the distribution must not be out of capital. Quaere: Might a different result be reached
under Revenue Act of 1938 §§ '3 Wc) (2) (B) and 27 (g), and § 115 (h) (distributions of stock or property or money)? See principal case at 365.
21. Credit Alliance Corporation, 42 B. T. A. 1o2o, o25 (1940).
But cf. Centennial Oil Co. v. Thomas, lO9 F. (2d) 359, 360 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) (holding that
27 (h) limits 27 (f) by way of exception).
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corporate structures.2 2 One thought that the two policies could be reconciled by not applying the tax to the subsidiary and then taxing the parent,
if the latter chose not to distribute the earnings thus received.2 3 This, however, overlooks the fact that the undistributed profits tax is levied not on
earnings, but on the yearly statutory income; 24 therefore the parent cannot be taxed.2 5 The instant decisions may reflect the courts' understandable unwillingness to torture the statutory language in order to promote a
policy Congress repudiated in part in 1938,28 and wholly in I94oY.2
Taxation-Loss on Sale of Property Acquired by Gift in TrustSecurities were transferred, without consideration, to trustees when worth
less than the cost to the donor. Subsequently, trustees sold them for more
than the fair market value at the time of transfer, but less than the cost to
the donor. Commissioner disallowed the donee's deduction of the difference between cost to donor and the selling price from his gross income,
claiming that the transaction was governed by § 113 (a) (2),' applying to
gifts, rather than § 113 (a) (3) 2 which applies to trusts. The court held
that the deduction was proper. Commissioner v. Warren Webster Trust
No. r, 122 F. (d) 915 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
Ever since 1921 the Internal Revenue Laws have provided that the
basis on sale of property acquired by gift shall be the basis in the hands
of the donor.2 Being uncertain of the scope of this section, Congress later
enacted a similar provision governing transfers in trust 4 which was subsequently found to be unnecessary when the Supreme Court held the gift
Instant cases at 364 and at 445 respectively.
Principal case, at 365. The Second Circuit did not discuss the parent's
taxability.
24. Revenue Act of 1936 § 14z(b). Cf. Revenue Act of 1938 § 13 (c).
25. The earnings remain earnings in the parent's hands; Commissioner v. Sansome, 6o F. (2d) 931 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 667 (1932). But
they do not constitute income since no gain is recognized; see note 2 supra. The
gain, if any, will not be recognized, if ever, until a subsequent sale of the property
by parent corporation; see INT. REV. CODE: § 113 (a) (6) (194o).
.26. Revenue Act of 1938 § 13 (c) (2)
(B). See Shaw, Revenue Act of x938
(C938) 13 CALF. ST. BAR J. No. II, 42; Sweeney, The 1938 Revenue Act: Corporate Income-Tax Features (1938) 27 GEo. L. J. 55.
22.
23.

27. Neither of the Revenue Acts of 194o nor the Revenue Act of 1941 contain

any provision perpetuating a general corporate undistributed profits tax. Some
doubts had been expressed regarding its constitutionality; see Hamilton, The Constitutior'ality of the Undistributed Profits Tax (939) 27 GEo. L. J. 17.
i. Revenue Act of 1936, § 113 (a) (2) : "Gifts after December 31, 1920.
the basis shall be the same as it would be in the hands of . . . the last preceding
owner by whom it was not acquired by gift, except that for the Purpose of deterni4ting loss the basis shall be the basis so determined or the fair tnizrket value of the
property at the time of the gift, whichever is lower." (Italics added.)
Throughout the subsequent discussion, "cost to donor" will be used as equivalent
to "basis in the hands of the donor" or "basis in the hands of the last preceding
owner by whom it was not acquired by gift".
2. Revenue Act of 1936, § 113 (a) (3): "Transfer in trust after December 31,
1920. .*.
.
(other than by transfer in trust by a bequest or devise) the basis shall
be the same as it would be in the hands of the grantor, increased in the amount of
gain or decreased in the amount of loss recognized to the grantor upon such transaction . . ."

The latter part of this section takes trusts for consideration out of

the exceptions of Section 113 (a) and place them under the general rule of basis
equal to the cost to the taxpayer.
3. Revenue Act of 1921, §202 (a) (2), was substantially similar to Section
113 (a) (2) now under consideration. However, the clause in italics, note i supra,
was not added until 1934.

4. Revenue Act of 1924, §204 (a) (3). Substantially the same as Section 113
(a) (3) now under consideration. See note 2 supra.
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section applicable to trusts also.5 To prevent a donee from deducting a
greater loss than he actually suffered, the gift section was amended in 1934
to provide that in the case of a loss the basis was to be either cost to the6
donor or fair market value at the time of transfer, whichever was lower.
To achieve the same result when the gift was in trust, the Treasury
promulgated regulations distinguishing between gratuitous trusts, which
were to be governed by the gift section, and trusts for consideration, to
be governed by the trust section.7 This regulation made the trust section
superfluous; 8 moreover, it was clear that Congress intended that the trust
section govern gratuitous trusts.9 On the ground that all sections of an
act should have meaning and functiofi, 1° and that the same transaction
could not be governed by two inconsistent sections of the same act, 1 the
instant court held the regulation invalid, as an attempt at legislation rather
than irterpretation.' 2 However, the reason for changing the rule governing gifts applies equally to trusts, 3 and it does not seem likely that
Congress intended the result to differ with the form of the transaction.
Obviously Congress merely forgot to amend the trust section; the regulation was intended to c6rrect this oversight. Inasmuch as the trust section
was originally passed to amplify, or clarify, the section, it does not seem
unreasonable to say that any change in the treatment of gifts should apply
to voluntary trusts. Had the Treasury based its regulation on this ground,
it is possible that the court would have upheld it. 14 The obvious solution,
of course, is a Congressional amendment to the Act.
5. Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U. S. 455 (1933).

6. The amendment added the words placed in italics, note I supra. As a result
of this amendment, if the gift property is ultimately sold for more than the value
when received, but less than the cost to the donor, there is neither gain nor loss on
the transaction.
7. U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 113. This was the first attempt to distinguish
between gratuitous trusts and trusts for consideration when dealing with these sections.
8. Under the regulations, the" trust section would merely place trusts Sfor consideration within the exceptions of Section 113 (a) and then take them out of the
exceptions by the "increased by" and "decreased by" clauses at the end of the section. See instant case at 918.
9. See report of the Senate Finance Committee, 68th Cong., ist Sess., Senate
Report No. 398, p. I7.
io. Instant case at gi8.
II. Instant case at 917.

12. The court considered the possibility of adoption by re-enactment.
The regulation in question was promulgated in 1934. The sections involved were re-enacted
in 1936 without change. Recognizing the "ample authority for this so-called 'reenactment' rule, although it has been much criticized for reasons which seem to us
to be cogent" (instant case at gig), the court found that it does not apply here because the statutory provisions in question (although not the addition to the gift section) were in existence for io years before the Treasury suggested the present interpretation. Had the court been in favor of the "rule" it might at last have mentioned that there was no reason for suggesting the distinction until 1934, an argument
made by the Treasury at page 16 of its brief.
13. The court states that the amendment was to prevent a type of tax evasion
that could not readily occur by use of the trust device and cites an illustration given

by the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives (73d Cong., 2d
Sess., H. R. No. 704, p. 27) to substantiate its position. The purpose of the amendment, according to this illustration, was to prevent a gift of property worth less than
cost, sale by the donee, and taldng of the loss by him. This same shifting can be
done by the trust device as well as by gift.
14. It might be argued that the gift section is applicable to voluntary, irrevocable
trusts (since they are completed gifts) ; this would leave revocable trusts to be governed by the'trust section. This argument, if made by the Treasury in Commissioner v. Title Guaranty and Trust Company, 41-2 U. S. T. C. I 9771 (C. C. A.
2d, i94i), was of no avail. That court, in a per curiam decision, decided this same
question on the basis of the opinion in the instant case.

